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Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
Is Blind Faith in Incapacitation Justified?
Incapacitation: Penal Confinement and the Restraint of Crime. By Franklin E.
Zimring* and Gordon Hawkins.- New York and London: Oxford University
Press, 1995. Pp. v, 188. $27.95.
The rate of incarceration in the United States surpasses that in all other
industrialized countries.' By mid-1994, the prison and jail population topped
one million-more than four times the number in 1975.2 The social benefit of
incapacitation, or physical restraint of offenders, seems obvious: A criminal
behind bars cannot commit crimes in society.3 Indeed, the political appeal of
prison construction derives largely from a simplistic faith in the concept of
incapacitation. For example, a headline in Corrections Today declared,
"Doubling the Prison Population Will Break America's Crime Wave."4
Likewise, in the aftermath of the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, former Attorney
General William Barr claimed, "'The choice is clear: more prison space or
more crime."' 5
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1. Elizabeth Alexander, The New Turn of the Screw: Why Good News About Controlling Incarceration
Rates Safely May Not Be Welcome, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 210 (1992) (citing MARC MAUER, AMERICANS
BEHIND BARS: ONE YEAR LATER 1 (1992)).
2. There were 1,012,851 men and women locked behind bars in 1994, as compared to 240,593 in
1975. Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391,
395 nn.22, 23 (1995).
3. Studies of the effect of incarceration on crime rates usually ignore crime within prisons. See, e.g.,
STEVE LEVITr, THE EFFECT OF PRISON POPULATION SIZE ON CRIME RATES: EVIDENCE FROM PRISON
OVERCRO\VDING LITIGATION (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5119, 1995);
WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION (1994); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE
SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991) [hereinafter IMPRISONMENT]; Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody,
Jr., Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction, 10 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1994).
Crimes committed within the prison walls, if explicitly acknowledged in a utilitarian analysis of
incapacitation, would reduce the calculated social benefit of crimes averted in society.
4. Eugene H. Methvin, Doubling the Prison Population Will Break America's Crime Wave,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 1992, at 28.
5. Joan Petersilia, California's Prison Policy: Causes, Costs, and Consequences, 72 PRISON J. 8, 9
(1992). In a similar vein, Phil Gramm claims that confining one prisoner for an additional year in prison
would save society $430,000 in crimes averted. See Phil Gramm, Drugs, Crime and Punishment: Don't Let
Judges Set Crooks Free, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A19. Zimring and Hawkins point out that were
Gramm's claim true, the 700,000 additional prisoners confined since 1980 would have created some $300
billion in savings-a figure larger than the federal deficit (p. v).
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Incapacitation lies at the core of the emotionally and ideologically charged
debate about crime and how to prevent it. But the most vocal participants in
this debate often lack factual support for their competing claims. Franklin
Zimring and Gordon Hawkins call for scholarly attention and empirical
research to unmask the tenuous theoretical and empirical foundations of
incapacitation as the dominant justification for imprisonment (pp. 12-15),6 and
to debunk predominantly conservative claims that additional imprisonment is
cost-effective (pp. 131-33).7 Their counteroffensive aims to reveal critical
deficiencies in the current methodologies used to estimate incapacitation
effects, to propose an alternative research strategy, to present some preliminary
findings, and to suggest policy implications of those findings.
Available research studies, based on either surveys of prisoners' self-
reports of criminal activity or official arrest records, provide widely varying
estimates of the marginal benefit of an additional incarcerated offender on
crime reduction-from 3 crimes per prison-year, to 14, to 187 (p. 80). Zimring
and Hawkins criticize the common model underlying such estimates for its
oversimplified view of the criminal career (pp. 44-47). They note that it fails
to account for variations in different offender groups' propensity to commit
crimes and the degree of selectivity of the incarceration strategy. A selective
strategy incarcerates "high rate" offenders first, and thus results in diminishing
marginal returns to crime reduction as more and more lower-rate offenders are
added to an expanding prison population (pp. 45-53).' Furthermore, both
offender surveys and official records generate individual crime rate figures that
may systematically overestimate the benefits of incarcerating each additional
prisoner because they neglect community-level effects. For example, group
crime may persist in the absence of one member,9 and others in the
6. Zimring and Hawkins assert that incapacitation has assumed its dominant position by default due
to decreasing reliance on rehabilitation (pp. 3,4,20,21-22,24), and deterrence (pp. 20, 26). However, they
relegate a limited discussion of the arguably central justification of moral desert to a later chapter on
jurisprudence (pp. 63, 64-67, 69, 74). Proponents of a moral framework for punishment based on "just
deserts" reject the incapacitative rationale. See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 82-87
(1973); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS 11-18 (1979); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND
SANCTIONS 94-97 (1993); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 19-26
(1976). While empirical analyses can shed light on the relative effectiveness of utilitarian
rationales-incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence-such analyses are irrelevant to the nonutilitarian,
moral-desert theorist.
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM BARR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CASE FOR MORE INCARCERATION (1992);
EDWIN NV. ZEDLEWSKI, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, MAKING CONFINEMENT DECISIONS (1987).
8. But see Marvell & Moody, supra note 3, at 115-18, for an attempt to adjust the individual crime
rate of prisoners or arrestees to reflect these variations.
9. Sociologists have at least begun to study co-offender effects on crime rates. See, e.g.. Albert J.
Reiss, Jr., Co-offending and Criminal Careers, in 10 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 117
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1988); Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & David P. Farrington, Advancing
Knowledge About Co-offending: Results from a Prospective Longitudinal Survey of London Males, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1991).
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community may "substitute" for the imprisoned offender, taking advantage of
the new criminal opportunity (pp. 85-86, 88). t"
In an effort to consider substitution and community-level effects neglected
in the offender-survey and official-record studies, Zimring and Hawkins
advocate a "natural experiment" methodology (pp. 92-95)" to study the
effect of a large increase in imprisonment on California's crime rate in the
1980s (pp. 100-27). The authors' initial findings actually confirm a negative
relationship between imprisonment levels and crime volume in California-i.e.,
additional years of imprisonment are associated with prevention of crime. They
estimate hypothetical levels of crime that would have occurred in the absence
of the large increase in the rate of imprisonment (pp. 108-14). Actual rates for
seven index felonies 2-both individually and in the aggregate-were below
the projected rates, with burglary and larceny offenses constituting more than
90% of the difference between the actual and expected figures (pp. 114-22).
The authors juxtapose these crime-reduction findings, however, with
evidence that burglary and larceny rates were reduced most substantially
among juveniles-the population for whom incarceration increased the least
(pp. 122-25). This "qualitative test" (p. 126) of the findings demonstrates that,
for the crimes most affected by the rise in incapacitation, the decrease in
arrests occurred among a population different than the group actually
incapacitated. Zimring and Hawkins offer this as evidence refuting a simple
negative correlation between imprisonment and crime rates, but they do not
provide any guidance to resolve the apparent contradiction.
In addition to leaving this contradiction unexplained, the authors' "natural
experiment" methodology contains a fundamental flaw. Zimring and Hawkins
10. John Donohue and Peter Siegelman offer an illustration of this "substitution effect":
If ... the average prisoner stole 51 cars in the year immediately prior to his incarceration, then
his incapacitation will not reduce the number of auto thefts by 51. Many crimes are the product
of criminal rings or gangs, and the loss of one criminal member will merely lead to the
recruitment of another. While the proposed imprisonment might reduce auto thefts somewhat
if the replacement thief that fills the void is less talented or energetic than his predecessor, one
simply cannot assume that crime will fall by the full 51.
JOHN J. DONOHUE III & PETER SIEGELMAN, IS THE UNITED STATES AT THE OPTIMAL RATE OF CRIME?
31 (American Bar Found. Working Paper No. 9404, 1995). Substitution effects are likely to be particularly
high for gambling and drug offenses because there are likely to be many others available to take the place
of those imprisoned. See, e.g., MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST ExcESs 122-23, 143-45 (1992).
1I. In the social sciences, researchers conduct "natural experiments" by seeking out and comparing
situations in which the factors under study vary while other conditions remain constant. For a more
extensive discussion of Zimring and Hawkins's natural-experiment methodology, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
& GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 263-68 (1973). The
natural-experiment methodology has been used to study the effect of incarceration policies on the crime
rate. See, e.g., Sheldon Ekland-Olson et al., Crime and Incarceration: Some Comparative Findings From
the 1980's, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 392 (1992). While natural-experiment methodology is a growing trend
in economics, some scholars remain skeptical of this technique, and some are even critical of controlled
experiments. See generally James J. Heckman, Randomization and Social Policy Evaluation, in
EVALUATING WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 201 (Charles F. Manski & Irwin Garfinkel eds., 1992)
(discussing limitations of the experimental method in economics in estimating impacts of social programs).
12. The seven index felonies are larceny, burglary, robbery, vehicle theft, assault, rape, and homicide
(p. 114, Table 6.3).
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claim that the very addition of 120,000 prisoners in just over a decade reflects
an abrupt "change in policy" assumed to affect the crime rate (p. 104). They
contend that the size of the "policy shift" and its abruptness mitigate "the
dangers of mistaken causal attribution" (p. 93).3 They do not, however, raise
the critical issue of "simultaneity bias"--the possibility of a simultaneous
causal interaction between imprisonment levels and crime rates; 14 i.e., while
an increase in imprisonment may reduce the crime rate, any increase in the rate
of crime simultaneously may raise the level of imprisonment (assuming the
prison sentence for any given offense remains constant). 5 Thus, Zimring and
Hawkins may draw erroneous conclusions from an estimated unidirectional
relationship and may underestimate the reduction in crime associated with an
increase in imprisonment. This would weaken their challenge to the apparent
negative correlation between imprisonment and the crime rate. 16
To "break" this simultaneity bias, or to isolate the independent effect of
changes in levels of imprisonment on the rate of crime, researchers need to
find a variable that affects the level of imprisonment but does not
independently affect the crime rate.17 In an innovative article, Steve Levitt
uses the status of prison-overcrowding litigation as such a variable."3 When
prison-overcrowding litigation forces states abruptly to curtail the number of
new prisoners, which in turn reduces the incarceration rate,19 Levitt finds that
13. Zimring and Hawkins suggest that "the more abrupt a change in policy, the more plausible the
assumption that the policy change rather than some other factor is responsible for any large
contemporaneous fluctuation in the rate of a presumed dependant variable" (p.94).
14. None of Zimring and Hawkins's suggested methods for minimizing the risk of mistaken causal
attribution--"magnitude, multiple assessments, and repetitive trials" (p. 93)-addresses simultaneity bias,
which is a key element. See Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel Nagin, On the Feasibility ofIdentifying the Crime
Function in a Simultaneous Model of Crime Rates and Sanction Levels, in DETERRENCE AND
INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 361, 363-65
(Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Marvell & Moody, supra note 3, at 110, 119-20; Daniel Nagin, Crime
Rates, Sanction Levels, and Constraints on Prison Population, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 341, 346-50 (1978);
Robert J. Sampson, Crime in Cities: The Effects of Formal and Informal Social Control, in COMMUNITIES
AND CRIME 271, 286-88 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Michael Tonry eds., 1986) (vol. 8, CRIME & JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH, supra note 9).
15. See Marvell & Moody, supra note 3, at 119. Alternatively, some researchers believe that crime
rates negatively affect sanctions; for example, the "limits of punishment" model posits that as crime rates
increase, assuming a constant level of imprisonment is maintained, the rate of imprisonment will decrease.
See Fisher & Nagin, supra note 14, at 365; Marvell & Moody, supra note 3, at 119-20.
16. If, on the other hand, the "limits of punishment" model is true, see supra note 15, then taking into
account simultaneity bias would reduce the magnitude of the negative correlation between imprisonment
and crime and, thus, could in fact bolster Zimring and Hawkins's argument.
17. For a straightforward discussion of the technique for estimating the effects of simultaneously
related variables, see Nagin, supra note 14, at 346-50.
18. See LEVITT, supra note 3. Levitt classifies six stages of prison litigation-from (1) no
overcrowding litigation filed, to (6) release of the prison system from court supervision-in twelve states
in which the entire state prison systems have come under court order concerning overcrowding. Id. at 7.
Other researchers have used alternative measures of prison capacity to conduct a similar instrumental-
variable analysis. See, e.g., Nagin, supra note 14, at 353-55 (using average incarceration rate of each state);
Sampson, supra note 14, at 284-99 (using actual rated design capacity of jails).
19. Levitt estimates the incapacitative effect when the incarceration rate is decreased. See LEVITT,
supra note 3, at 4. Zimring and Hawkins propose this technique for a hypothetical community-level study
as a complement to their own study but do not highlight its potential significance in addressing simultaneity
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crime rates do indeed increase. Levitt's estimates suggest that, absent the
quadrupling of the prisoner population of the past two decades, violent crime
would be twice as high today and property crime would be over 80% more
frequent.20 His estimates are larger than those of previous studies that, like
Zimring and Hawkins's, fail to account for simultaneity bias and thus may
systematically underestimate the dampening effect of imprisonment on crime
rates.2'
Incapacitation is part of Zimring and Hawkins's ongoing effort to develop
more rigorous analyses of the impact of imprisonment on crime: 22 They
challenge the foundations of political slogans and rhetoric, synthesize empirical
and policy concerns, and focus on the practical implications of their research
efforts. Their harsh critique of the role of economic analysis in criminal justice
policy, however, ironically contradicts their valiant call for data and
measurement in a field not always responsive to empirical analysis.23
Zimring and Hawkins conclude that "[t]he criminal law is a moral system,
not an economic one" (p. 153). Yet, if imprisonment is a moral question, then
people should be punished for their actions, regardless of incapacitation's cost
or its ability to prevent any crime.24 Implicit in Zimring and Hawkins's
concern for social welfare, however, is a markedly more utilitarian perspective
on incapacitation. Taking a broader view of the role of economic analysis
would strengthen this perspective and lead to improvements in the authors'
methodology.2 Certainly, cost-benefit analysis can at least inform a utilitarian
discussion of the best "mix" of crime control and prevention techniques and,
bias (p. 95). While testing changes in one variable in both directions may provide a certain amount of
verification, it is still testing a unidirectional relationship and thus neglects any potential bias if the
variables simultaneously affect one another.
20. See LEVITr, supra note 3, at 17-18. Levitt's conclusions are derived from "elasticity" estimates
of .424 and .379 for violent crime, and .321 and .261 for property crime. Id. at 17. The "elasticity" of crime
with respect to imprisonment is the percentage reduction in crime that would result from a 1% increase in
the prison and jail population. High elasticity values imply that the increases in imprisonment have a
substantial crime-reduction effect. For a good discussion of elasticity of crime, see SPELMAN, supra note
3, at 220-21.
21. See, e.g., SPELMAN, supra note 3, at 220 (reporting "best, single guess" elasticity estimate of .16
from Rand Corporation 1978 surveys in California, Michigan, and Texas); Marvell & Moody, supra note
3, at 133 (calculating elasticity estimate of .16 for reported index crimes from state-level panel data).
22. The authors' present work builds on their previous studies. See IMPRISONMENT, supra note 3;
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, PRISON POPULATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY IN
CALIFORNIA (1992).
23. See, e.g., NitS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY 185 (1993) ("[J]ustice does not consist
of ready-made principles to be excavated using the methods applied in law or in the social sciences, but
of common knowledge which each generation has to formulate into legal principles.").
24. See id. at 185 ("A suitable amount of pain is not a question of utility, of crime control, of what
works. It is a question of standards based on values. It is a cultural question."); supra note 6.
25. In their critique of existing research methodologies, the authors claim that "[n]o attention has been
previously devoted to the systematic explanation of factors tending toward substitution" (p. 55), neglecting
the central role that substitution effects play in economic analysis, see, e.g., DONOHUE & SIEGELMAN, supra
note 10, at 31-32. Zimring and Hawkins do not cite regression studies of aggregate crime rates, which, by
measuring the net change in crime, do capture group offenses and substitution offenses, see, e.g., LEvrrr,
supra note 3; Sampson, supra note 14, at 271.
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thus, the determination of an empirically informed penal policy.26 In their zeal
to denounce contemporary research's emphasis on monetized cost-benefit
analysis that compares the dollar costs of prison construction with the dollar
savings of crimes averted (pp. 131_54),27 Zimring and Hawkins downplay the
increasingly important role of such analysis in evaluating alternatives to
incarceration.28 Similarly, their dismissal of certain types of empiricism blinds
them to the possibility of incorporating economic methodologies into their
natural-experiment framework.29
Incapacitation is a compelling reminder of the danger of an ideology of
crime control rooted in little more than political rhetoric. However, as long as
public opinion connects increased levels of imprisonment with reduced levels
of crime, policymakers will stifle any impulse to implement the kind of
research Zimring and Hawkins suggest. "[F]aith rather than measurement is
now, as throughout penal history, the engine for current reliance on general
incapacitation in penal policy" (p. 74). Ziring and Hawkins's call for
empiricism exposes society's blind faith in the alleged social benefits of
incapacitation. Such empiricism, however, must now incorporate economic
methodologies and findings in order to identify the true relationship between
imprisonment and crime.
-Catherine M. Sharkey
26. Cost-benefit analysis need not be the final word on policy determinations. "While economics is
a powerful and valuable tool in the analysis of legal and public policy issues, those who use it need an
appreciation of its limitations." John J. Donohue III & Ian Ayres, Posner's Symphony No. 3: Thinking
About the Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L. REV. 791, 793 (1987) (book review). In the present context, "[t]he
finding that prisons appear cost-beneficial does nothing to reduce the importance of identifying and
correcting those factors that lie at the source of criminal behavior." LEViTr, supra note 3, at 26.
27. The authors present a conservative economist's flawed monetary cost-benefit methodology as
representative of the economic approach: Edwin J. Zedlewski, When Have We Punished Enough?, 45 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 771, 778 (1985) (arguing "that greater social benefits are derived from prison incarceration
than are usually assumed" (p. 142)). Zedlewski claims that one year's imprisonment costs $25,000,
compared to some $430,000 in social costs avoided by incapacitation (p. 143) (citing ZEDLEWSKI, supra
note 7, at 3, 4). The authors contend that Zedlewski's monetized estimates merely reflect an inflated
underlying estimate of 187 nondrug crimes per year saved with each additional prisoner incarcerated---"an
overestimate by a range of between 1,000 and 2,000 percent" (p. 145).
28. The authors do admit a certain utility in using cost-benefit analysis to weigh policy
altematives--evaluating incapacitation within the broader context of crime control (pp. 74-75). Cf. Michael
C. Musheno et al., Community Corrections as an Organizational Innovation: What Works and Why, 26 J.
RFS. CRIME & DELINQ. 136, 137 (1989) ("[A] total commitment to the incarceration of all adult felons
represents a costly enterprise that cannot be sustained in practice. Ironically, the institutionalization of
incapacitation is providing a strategic opening for community corrections and other alternatives to
incarceration (e.g., electronic monitoring).").
29. The authors criticize "the value of low-budget multiple regression studies of the variety frequently
found in econometrics and other social science areas" (p. 93). Regression analysis, a statistical technique
that isolates the independent influence of each of several variables on a dependent variable of interest, is
used in many sound studies. See. e.g., SPELMAN, supra note 3, at 2-10 (describing economic model of
crime control through incapacitation, specifying social tradeoff between crime and imprisonment-both
measured in dollar amounts); Joel Waldfogel, Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on
Federal Fraud Offenders, 38 J.L. & ECON. 107 (1995) (constructing theory of efficient punishment based
on economic model of punishment production). There is no reason why a natural-experiment methodology
cannot incorporate econometric modeling. See, e.g., JOHN B. KNIGHT & RICHARD H. SABOT, EDUCATION,
PRODUCTIVITY, AND INEQUALITY: THE EAST AFRICAN NATURAL EXPERIMENT 7-14 (1990).
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